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Efficiency Trade-Offs in Patent Litigation
Settlements: Analysis Gone Astray?
By KEITH LEFFLER AND CRISTOFER LEFFLER*
PATENTS ARE INTENDED to allow a patent holder to obtain mo-
nopoly profits. To have this effect, a patent must limit competition.'
As a consequence of limited competition, valuable patents result in
"static inefficiency" 2 because consumer welfare suffers from high mo-
nopoly prices. Valid patents may nonetheless be efficient in a "dy-
namic" sense3 because the possibility of monopoly profits spurs
incentives to develop new products. 4 Consequently, as recognized by
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Cardizem. Cristofer Leffler is an associate attorney at Graham & Dunn PC in Seattle. The
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1. Of course, not all patents give the patent holder market or monopoly power. This
is the case when, for example, the patented good faces many close substitutes at prices
equal to its marginal costs or when there is little or no consumer value of the patented
good. This Article does not consider cases where a patent gives no market power because
in those cases there will be no gains from a payment settlement and therefore no economic
incentive to engage in such settlements.
2. "Static inefficiency" refers to the inefficient allocation of available resources at a
given point in time.
3. "Dynamic efficiency" refers to the efficient allocation of available resources over a
period of time.
4. Even this presumption is not without controversy. "If national patent laws did not
exist, it would be difficult to make a conclusive case for introducing them[,] ... and it is
equally difficult to make a really conclusive case for abolishing them." EDITH T. PENROSE,
THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 40 (1951); see alsoJosh Lerner, 150
Years of Patent Protection, 92 Am. EcoN. REv. 221 (2002) (finding that strengthening a patent
system did not significantly impact inventions); Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the
Returns to Industrial Research & Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. AcrivrTv 783
(1987) (finding that patents are not among the important means to appropriate returns to
innovation, although the pharmaceutical industry may be the exception); Wesley M. Co-
hen et al., NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH WORKING PAPER, PROTECTING THEIR INTELLEC-
TUAL ASSETS: APPROPRIABILITY CONDITIONS AND WHY U.S. MANUFACTURING FIRMS PATENT
(OR NOT) 7552 (2000), at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552 (last accessed Oct. 10,
2004). Mariko Sakakibara & Lee Branstetter, Do Stronger Patents Induce More Innovation?
Evidence from the 1988Japanese Patent Reform Laws, 32 RAND J. ECON. 77 (2001), found only a
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many courts, patents present an inherent trade-off between static inef-
ficiency and dynamic efficiency. 5
Disputes as to the legitimacy and scope of a patent frequently
arise. Many recent cases in the pharmaceutical industry involve settle-
ments of such disputes, which feature a payment from the patent
holder to the challenger. Private patent settlement agreements includ-
ing those involving cash payments may be presumed to increase the
value of the patent to the patent holder and thereby to increase dy-
namic efficiency. Nonetheless, we here argue that a per se rule against
patent litigation settlements involving a cash payment from the patent
holder to the challenger will maximize economic efficiency. Part I be-
gins by providing a brief overview of the economic nature and value,
both private and social, of patent rights. Parts II through IV then con-
sider the economic impact of patent litigation settlement agreements
and demonstrate that payments from the patent holder to the chal-
lenger are contrary to efficient patent litigation settlements. Part V
then demonstrates that a probabilistic analysis of patent rights is con-
sistent with traditional burdens of proof. Finally, this Article discusses
an alternative approach towards judging patent settlements in which
the efficiency of patent settlements is based on the patent's "validity."
This Article concludes that such an approach makes no economic
sense.
I. The Economic Nature of a Patent
Economics provides little guidance to the determination of the
optimal static-dynamic efficiency trade-off.6 Regardless, Congress has
very small effect on research and development ("R&D") activity from expanding the scope
ofJapanese patents. Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revis-
ited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32 RANDJ.
ECON. 101 (2001), found that large patent portfolios were mainly of help in negotiating
cross-licensing agreements but that patents had little impact on innovating activity.
5. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1307 (11th Cir. 2003)
("A Suitable accommodation between antitrust law's free competition requirement and the
patent regime's incentive system is required by the complementary objectives of [patent
law and antitrust law]."); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride (Cipro) Antitrust Litig., 261 F.
Supp. 2d 188, 255-57 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
6. SeeJEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 399 (1988) ("The wel-
fare analysis [of patents] is relatively complex, and more work is necessary before clear and
applicable conclusions will be within reach.") ("The current theories are much too rudi-
mentary to be realistic."); Tuomas Takalo, On the Optimal Patent Policy, 14 FINNISH ECON.
PAPERS 33, 33 (2001) (" 'Numerous attempts have been made to identify the optimal mix of
patent breadth and patent life. Unfortunately, the range of contradictory results reported
in literature is rather impressive."' (citation omitted));JEFFREY K. MACME-MASON, WHAT To
Do ABOUT UNILATERAL REFUSALS To LICENSE 1 (2002), available at http://www-personal.
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specified a set of laws, rules, and procedures governing the granting
and use of patents. 7 In enacting these rules and procedures, Congress
has implicitly balanced the trade-off between the static efficiency of
competition and low prices against the dynamic efficiency of in-
creased incentives to seek patentable innovations. A proper economic
welfare analysis of patent rights must take as given the patent rules
specified by Congress with the presumption that those rules properly
and correctly balance static and dynamic efficiency.8
In granting procedural rights to a patent holder, Congress did
not provide that a patent is conclusively presumed to be valid. 9
Rather, the ultimate validity and scope of a patent cannot be known
until final resolution of such issues by the courts.10 The patent owner
is never certain of its "right" to exclude others from the use or sale of
the patented invention."1 Even if the patent owner has knowledge of
an alleged infringement, the patent owner cannot seize allegedly in-
fringing goods. Moreover, the patent holder may choose not to elicit
governmental efforts to exclude an alleged infringer because the pro-
cess is costly. Finally, and most importantly, when the patent holder
does attempt to enforce its rights through the coercive power of the
umich.edu/-jmm/papers/doj-ftc-refusals-to-deal.pdf (last accessed Oct. 10, 2004) ("The
optimal balance between innovation incentives and protection against static monopoly
harm is not knowable to any reasonable degree of precision.").
7. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000).
8. It is the details of the substantive and procedural rules, as interpreted by the
courts, that determine the economic value of a patent holder's rights. See Carl Shapiro,
Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RANDJ. ECON. 391, 392 (2003) ("[R]ules governing
settlements affect what is truly meant by the patent grant itself. In fact, in many fast-moving
industries, the rules governing patent litigation and settlements are arguably far more im-
portant to patentees than the single variable on which economists have traditionally fo-
cused, namely patent length.").
9. 35 U.S.C. § 282 ("A patent shall be presumed valid."). As stated by the Supreme
Court: "The heart of [the patent owner's] legal monopoly is the right to invoke the State's
power to prevent others from utilizing his discovery without his consent." Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969); see also Magnivision, Inc. v.
Bonneau Co., 115 F.3d 956, 960 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("The *validity of a patent is always subject
to plenary challenge on its merits. A court may invalidate a patent on any substantive
ground, whether or not that ground was considered by the patent examiner.").
10. Indeed, a recent Federal Trade Commission ("FrC") study found that in 73% of
Hatch-Waxman cases, the generic manufacturer was found not to have infringed a valid
patent. FED. TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT ExPIRATION: AN FTC
STUDY 13 (2002). A so-called "Hatch-Waxman case" is one brought pursuant to the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1994)).
11. The courts have recognized the inherent uncertainty of patent rights. See, e.g., In
re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride (Cipro) Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 208, 212, 251
(E.D.N.Y. 2003).
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government, its efforts may result in a finding of patent invalidity or
non-infringement.
Many patents granted by the patent office are subsequently invali-
dated by the courts. 12 The consequent vulnerability of a patent creates
an incentive for potential competitors to challenge the patent's valid-
ity or infringe upon it. Thus, the patent rules themselves provide an
economic incentive for potential infringers to seek a judicial finding
of invalidity or non-infringement. This incentive is a result of the very
process and rules by which a patent holder may seek to enforce its
right to exclude.
The incentives to challenge patents are particularly strong in the
case of pharmaceutical patents because the Hatch-Waxman Amend-
ments provide additional rewards motivating such challenges.13 In the
Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress expressly strengthened the incentive to
challenge a pharmaceutical patent by offering 180 days of exclusivity
to the first generic manufacturer to file a new drug application under
the Hatch-Waxman Amendment's abbreviated process. 14 As noted by
Judge Trager in In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride (Cipro) Antitrust Litiga-
tion,15 the "impetus behind the Hatch-Waxman Amendments was 'to
make available more low cost generic drugs."16
Prior to a final court resolution of the validity and scope of a pat-
ent, the uncertainty as to the exact rights possessed by a patent holder
under the rules enacted by Congress implies that the expected profits
from a patent are in practice necessarily less than the full monopoly
profits with complete exclusion. This is because of the "discount" to
the full monopoly profits for the likelihood that the patent is invalid
or limited in scope. The presumption that Congress correctly bal-
anced static and dynamic efficiency implies that it is this expected
12. SeeJohn R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 192 (1998); Kimberly A. Moore,Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-
An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REv. 365, 392 (2000).
13. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1994)).
14. In re Cipro, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 204. The court stated:
[T]he crux of plaintiffs' claim of a per se violation is that the challenged agree-
ments allowed Barr to accept cash in exchange for an agreement to halt the pro-
cess by which a court would make such a determination [of whether the patent is
valid or invalid]-a process encouraged by the Hatch-Waxman Amendments and
beneficial to consumers.
Id.; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (5) (B) (iv).
15. 261 F. Supp. 2d 188 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
16. In re Cipro, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 192; see alsoAndrx Pharms. v. Biovail Corp. Int'l, 256
F.3d 799, 809 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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profit, which is less than the full monopoly profit that creates the
proper and efficient innovation incentive. Similarly, the presumption
that Congress correctly balanced static and dynamic efficiency implies
that increases in the expected profit to a patent holder through pri-
vate agreements with potential competitors creates inefficient innova-
tion incentives.
II. The Evaluation of Efficient Settlements Should Not
Include Dynamic Efficiency Impacts
Where there is a patent for which validity has not yet been deter-
mined, the patent holder and potential infringers or competitors will
have an economic incentive to reach agreements settling patent dis-
putes. Indeed, from the challenger's perspective, there is an incentive
to create and settle a dispute, with the challenger agreeing not to
compete in return for a share of the monopoly profit. This incentive
exists because the profit from the patent absent competition will nec-
essarily be greater than the total profit earned by a patent holder plus
that earned by any producer of a substitute competing product.' 7 Of
course, the increase in profits from such a settlement is at the expense
of consumer welfare because consumers pay higher prices due to the
lack of competition. The ever-present incentive to perpetuate the mo-
nopoly profit at consumers' expense underlies the efficiency of anti-
trust limits to settlement of patent disputes.
A basic premise underlying economic analysis is that parties to a
private agreement are better off than if they had not reached the
agreement. Hence, in the context of patent settlement agreements, it
can be assumed that the patent holder achieves an increase in the
expected profit as a result of the settlement. Thus, as a consequence
of limiting a challenge to the patent through a private settlement
agreement, the patent holder increases its expected profit above that
granted by the patent itself. This increase in profit does increase the
incentive to innovate. However, because it is the expected profit from
the patent that dictates the efficient incentive to innovate, such pri-
vate agreements limiting patent challenges increase the profits be-
yond those granted by Congress and beyond those that are presumed
17. If the patent holder and the challenger each have sufficient and favorably biased
expectations as to their respective likelihood of prevailing in litigation, the added profits
from sharing of the monopoly profits may not be sufficient to overcome the differing ex-
pectations. These cases in which settlement is not possibleare discussed further below.
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necessary for the efficient encouragement of innovation.' 8 Hence, pri-
vate patent settlement agreements can be presumed to improperly
favor dynamic over static efficiency. Therefore, based on the static-
dynamic efficiency balancing that Congress is assumed to have "gotten
right," private patent settlement agreements should be presumed inef-
ficient. Any impacts on "R&D" incentives and dynamic efficiency from
a patent settlement need not be "balanced" in judging the settlement
because Congress has already correctly maximized the static versus dy-
namic trade-off in creating the patent rules and procedures.
Basic economic principles also imply that if it were costless to re-
solve the validity and substantive scope of patents through litigation,
the "efficient" balancing of static costs and benefits would always re-
quire such resolution through the courts. This implication follows
from the presumption that Congress set up the efficient rules to re-
solve such disputes. Therefore, if litigation were costless, economic ef-
ficiency would imply that private settlements of patent disputes that
create any static inefficiency would not be allowed; rather, courts
would decide all such matters. 19 Of course, resolution of patent valid-
ity through the courts is not costless. This implies that the costs of
litigation, and only these costs, give rise to the possibility of efficient
private settlements. 2 0 However, only if the costs of litigation exceed
the expected consumer welfare increase from the possibility of in-
creased competition if a patent is found invalid or not infringed can
private settlement of a patent dispute be efficient.
Challenges to a patent's scope or validity have efficiency benefits
since challenges may increase competition and lower prices. The sys-
tem of patent rights designed by Congress that allows private chal-
lenges to those rights is congruent with the interests of consumers.
Nonetheless, private patent settlement agreements can be desirable
18. Any change to the rules and procedures governing patent rights that increases the
expected profits from patents will increase the incentive to invest in seeking patents. This
applies equally to rules allowing or constraining private agreements to extend patents, pri-
vate agreements to limit competition among patent holders, or private agreements to give
up a patent challenge in return for a share of the monopoly profits from the patent. How-
ever, such impacts on patent investment decisions are inefficient because they allow profit
beyond that of the "optimal" rules that have been set by Congress.
19. Costless resolution of patent disputes is equivalent to a situation in which each
patent reaches instantaneous, final resolution in the courts on disputed issues. In such a
case, there would be no uncertainty concerning the validity and scope of all patents and no
procompetitive benefits from agreements settling the dispute or from any private exten-
sions of the patent rights.
20. This implies that all interim settlements that do not dispose of the litigation are
necessarily inefficient.
[Vol. 39
because the expected costs of resolving the dispute (litigation costs)
may exceed any expected consumer gains from the litigation. How-
ever, it can be quite difficult to measure expected litigation costs or
expected consumer welfare gains from litigation. Yet, frequently, the
relative efficiency of settlements of patent disputes can be judged
without such complete knowledge of expected litigation costs or ex-
pected consumer welfare benefits.
Consider, for example, an "early entry" settlement in which the
patent settlement allows the challenger to enter the market prior to
the expiration of the disputed patent. An early entry settlement is rela-
tively efficient as compared to a cash payment settlement in which the
challenger agrees not to enter the market for some period of time in
exchange for a share of the patent holder's monopoly profits. Since
settlements eliminate the litigation costs by resolving the litigation,
the relative efficiency of these settlements can therefore be judged
solely based on the consumer welfare benefits. An early entry settle-
ment will result in increased competition and a distribution of settle-
ment benefits to consumers that more closely mimic the consumer
benefits that would be expected from the patent litigation rules and
procedures enacted by Congress. Similarly, a patent settlement that
licenses the challenger is relatively efficient compared to a cash pay-
ment settlement, as the license settlement allows some extent of ge-
neric competition and, thereby, passes on some of the gains from
settlement to consumers.
It is also straightforward to conclude that a settlement that in-
cludes a payment from the patent holder to the challenger and an
early entry or licensing agreement is generally economically ineffi-
cient.21 The payment inclusion will likely result in the challenger ac-
cepting less favorable entry timing or a higher licensing fee than
otherwise would be negotiated. This result is to the clear detriment of
consumers and optimally balances static and dynamic efficiency as dic-
tated by the rules and procedures established by Congress.
21. The exception to this is if a payment was necessary to reach a settlement and the
cost of litigation exceeded the expected consumer benefits from the litigation. However, as
we show below, this is not likely the case and the remote possibility of such a case does not
alter the efficiency of a per se rule.
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III. There Is No Legitimate Justification for Cash Payment
Settlements
A. Exclusion Payments Are Not Needed to Settle Hatch-Waxman
Pharmaceutical Patent Disputes
Patent litigation is undoubtedly very expensive. If lump sum pay-
ments were necessary or even frequently required for settlement of
patent challenges, a policy preventing all lump sum settlements could
prevent otherwise efficient settlements. The fact that lump sum pay-
ments may possibly be required to reach settlement in patent litiga-
tion cases underlies recent opposition to a per se treatment of
payment settlements. 22 Marc Schildkraut seized on this possibility not-
ing that
there are conditions under which an explicit or implicit "reverse"
payment is necessary to settle patent litigation. There may be a gap
between the parties that prevents settlement. This gap may be the
result of a difference in perceptions about the outcome of the liti-
gation or a difference in risk preferences. 23
Mr. Schildkraut bases his arguments on the formal analysis of Wil-
lig and Bigelow, who show that it is theoretically possible that a pay-
ment from the patent holder to the generic challenger may be
required to reach a settlement.24 However, neither Schildkraut nor
Willig and Bigelow perform any analysis of the likelihood that such a
payment is required for settlement.
Examples can be constructed in which a settlement requires a
lump sum payment. Such examples, however, arise only under ex-
treme and unlikely conditions so that the theoretic possibility that
cash payments are needed to reach efficient settlements provides no
practical justification for allowing such settlements. To demonstrate
22. See, e.g., Yee W. Chin & Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Antitrust Update, 2 MERGERS &
AcQUISITIONs 30, 38 (2001); Richard J. Gilbert & Willard K. Tom, Is Innovation King at the
Antitrust Agencies? The Intellectual Property Guidelines Five Years Later, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 78
(2001); Thomas B. Leary, Antitrust Issues in Settlement of Pharmaceutical Patent Disputes, ArNrI-
TRUST HEALTH CARE CHRON., Winter 2001, at 2, 6-7; Kevin D. McDonald, Patent Settlements
and Payments that Flow the "Wrong" Way: The Early History of a Bad Idea, ANTITRUST HEALTH
CARE CHRON., Winter 2002, at 2, 3-4.
23. Marc Schildkraut, Patent-Splitting Settlements and the Reverse Payment Fallacy, 71 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 1033, 1058 (2004). Mr. Schildkraut represented Schering-Plough in In re Scher-
ing-Plough Corp., No. 9297, 2003 F.T.C. LEXIS 187 (Dec. 8, 2003).
24. Robert Willig & John Bigelow, Antitrust Policy Towards Agreements that Settle Patent
Litigation, ANTITRUST BULL. (forthcoming 2004). This analysis was presented by Professor
Willig in his testimony on behalf of Schering-Plough before the FTC in In re Schering-Plough
Corp.
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the irrelevance of the Willig-Bigelow-Schildraut cash payment neces-
sity situation, consider a typical generic challenge in some detail.
Assume a patented brand-name product with current and ex-
pected future annual sales of $500 million is subject to a generic chal-
lenge to its patent validity, as illustrated in Table 1.25 The remaining
expected period of exclusivity under the patent is presumed to be
three additional years if either an agreement is reached with the ge-
neric challenger or the patent is found valid by the court. In addition,
assume a profit margin above production and marketing expenses of
60% for the brand-name product absent generic entry. Future profits
are reduced to present value using a discount rate of 10%. These as-
sumptions are summarized in Table 1 of the appendix.
As also shown in Table 1, with generic entry, the brand-name pro-
ducer will expect to retain only 40% of its sales during the first six
months of generic competition and 20% of the sales thereafter. The
generic challenger will set a price of 70% of the brand during the first
six months of its entry when it has exclusivity. With no marketing ex-
penses, the generic will expect a profit margin of 90% of the initial
brand price. Thereafter, the generic price will fall to 20% of the initial
brand price and the generic challenger will share the market with sub-
sequent entrants, capturing one-third of the generic sales. The litiga-
tion costs of the brand name and the generic are assumed to be $20
million each.
The final set of assumptions concern the brand-name firm's reac-
tion to the entry of the generic. Substantial research and the facts of
cases under litigation indicate that little or no price change is ex-
pected for the brand-name product. 26 Therefore, assume the brand-
name price is not impacted by generic entry. However, post-generic
entry, the benefits from market expansion or retention or both will
mostly benefit the generic entrant; therefore, the brand-name firm
facing generic competition is expected to, and typically does, substan-
tially reduce its marketing expense. The particular assumptions used
regarding the marketing efforts and the effects on the market size are
detailed in Table 1. In essence, the marketing efforts are reduced pro-
25. The assumptions of this example are generally consistent with the various cases
that the authors are familiar with. The details of the assumptions are relatively unimpor-
tant to the result that payments from the brand-name firm to the generic are generally not
necessary to settle patent litigation. Table I is located in the appendix to this Article.
26. See, e.g., Z. John Lu & William S. Comanor, Strategic Pricing of New Pharmaceuticals,
REV. ECON. & STAT., Feb. 1998, at 108-09; see generally Steven N. Wiggins & Robert Maness,
Price Competition in Pharmaceuticals: The Case of Anti-Infectives, 42 ECON. INQUiRY 247 (2004).
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portionally to the reduced brand name share and the "average return"
to the marketing efforts is 15%.27
The assumptions from Table 1 imply that the expected present
value of the profits to the brand-name firm, absent the generic entry,
is $782 million. Of course, the expected profits from litigation depend
upon the expectations of the brand-name firm and of the generic as
to the likelihood of winning the litigation. Settlement will be possible
for all pairs of expectations in which the combined expected profits of
the two firms from litigation are less than the profit under monopoly.
Not surprisingly, settlement is expected unless the parties have ex-
tremely optimistic expectations about success compared to that of the
other party. This is not surprising because the profits to the generic
from entry are significantly less than the losses to the brand-name firm
caused by the generic's entry. This profit gain from the perpetuation
of the monopoly, plus the litigation costs, creates thejoint profitability
of a settlement unless the two parties' beliefs are widely divergent and
optimistic relative to one another.
Consider now the case of a settlement by the brand name seller
in which the generic is allowed to enter prior to the end of the three-
year period of exclusivity absent the challenge. 28 Assume the expected
market shares, prices, and marketing efforts correspond to those
under a six-month exclusive generic entry if a patent challenge were
successful.
Table 2 summarizes the results of the analysis. Table 2 first shows
the maximum expectations of prevailing in the patent litigation for
the generic firm, given the expectations of the brand-name firm,
which makes both a cash payment settlement possible and an early
entry settlement possible. The first case is one in which the brand-
name firm is certain that it will prevail. In this case, settlement will be
possible only if the generic expects that its chances of prevailing are
56% or less. As also shown in the table, an early entry settlement will
also be possible if the generic expects a 41% or less chance of winning
the litigation. If the brand-name firm has an expectation of winning of
94% or less, settlement is possible regardless of the generic firm's ex-
27. Reasonable changes to these particular assumptions change no conclusions.
28. In earlier research, a model of licensing under somewhat different parameters
than used here was considered. See generally Cristofer Leffler & Keith Leffler, Settling the
Controversy over Patent Settlements: Payments by the Patent Holder Should Be Per Se Illegal, 21 REs.
L. & EcoN. 475 (2004) [hereinafter Leffler & Leffler, Settling the Controversy]. The essential
findings were the same as found here-cash payments are rarely if even needed to settle
patent challenges, and the cases in which such payments are required occur only in unrea-
sonable and unrealistic situations. Id. at 477-85.
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pectations. Also, as shown in Table 2, an early entry settlement, with-
out any cash payment to the generic, will be possible as long as the
brand-name firm has an expectation of winning of 91% or less. Thus,
even with these outlandishly divergent expectations, cash payments
are necessary to reach an efficient settlement only when the brand-
name firm's expectation of winning is greater than 91%.29
The lower portion of Table 2 shows the maximum expectations
of prevailing in the patent litigation for the brand firm, given the ex-
pectations of the generic firm, which makes a cash payment settle-
ment possible and also for which an early entry settlement is possible.
The first case is one in which the generic firm is "certain" that it will
prevail. In this case, a settlement will be possible only if the brand-
name firm expects that its chances of prevailing are 94% or less; an
early entry settlement will also be possible as long as the brand firm
expects a 91% or less chance of winning the litigation.
The implication of this analysis is that it is extremely unlikely that
cash payments are needed for settlement of patent cases. Substantial
research has been conducted regarding the likely results of patent liti-
gation.30 The results indicate that over one-half of all challenged pat-
ents are found invalid. Hence, it is not expected that a brand-name
firm would have an expectation as high as 91% that it will prevail in a
patent challenge. The analysis summarized in Table 2 indicates that
even for unrealistic expectations of winning substantially above 70%
by the brand-name firm, regardless of the generic firm's expectations,
settlements without cash payments will generally be possible. In addi-
tion, while firms may have somewhat different expectations as to the
outcome of patent litigation, the narrow range of wildly divergent ex-
pectations required to make cash payment settlements necessary for
settlement are simply not expected to occur.
Therefore, we reach the conclusion that the theoretical possibil-
ity that cash payments are necessary to settle patent litigation, noted
in our early research and more recently emphasized by authors sup-
porting such settlements, while perhaps of academic interest, is of no
relevance to a proper evaluation of the competitive or efficiency im-
pact of these settlements. This is particularly significant when it is rec-
ognized that litigants will always prefer cash payment settlements
because such settlements will eliminate the sharing in the gains of the
patent challenge by consumers. For example, even if both the patent
29. Table 2 is available in the appendix to this Article.
30. See, e.g., Allison & Lemley, supra note 12.
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holder and the challenger are certain that the patent is invalid, settle-
ment will be jointly profitable because a cash payment settlement will
perpetuate the monopoly profits, which then may be divided among
the brand-name firm and the generic. Hence, if cash payment settle-
ments are allowed in all those cases in which a procompetitive settle-
ment would otherwise be reached (which is likely to be all cases),
competition will be limited. Therefore, cash payment settlements are
anticompetitive and should not be allowed.
In contrast to the privately preferred exclusionary payment settle-
ment, settling a patent dispute via a licensing agreement is inherently
different in its competitive impact. A licensing agreement is of value
to a patent challenger only because it allows the challenger to enter
the market in competition with the patent holder. The economic ex-
pectation is that the licensee will take sales from the patent holder by
offering more favorable prices. Hence, a license settlement agreement
offers an alternative method to litigation by which lower cost drugs
can be made available to consumers. Unlike payments to remain off
the market, a licensing settlement transfers some of the benefits of a
settlement to consumers. Thus, a licensing settlement is always pre-
ferred on an efficiency basis to a settlement that perpetuates the
monopoly.
The approach taken here in evaluating the inefficiency of a pay-
ment settlement agreement is like that undertaken by the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") in In re Schering-Plough.3 1 There, the FTC
noted that "there are likely to be efficiencies associated with the settle-
ment of patent disputes between pioneer and generic manufacturers.
A settlement can save public and private resources that would other-
wise be consumed by the litigation .... ,,32
The FTC's analysis explored how the generic will settle only if it
expects profits from the settlement at least equal to those expected
from litigation. Thus, the efficiency issue in evaluating a payment set-
tlement "is whether these unconditional payments were likely to have
anticompetitive effects because they delayed generic entry beyond the
dates that would have been agreed upon in the absence of the
payments." 33
The FTC focused on how settlements can be efficient by saving
litigation costs while taking into account that efficient settlements rec-
ognize consumers' interest by generating some competition. The FTC
31. No. 9297, 2003 F.T.C. LEXIS 187 (Dec. 8, 2003).
32. Id. at *81-*82 (citations omitted).
33. Id. at *22.
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concluded that the payment from the brand-name company to delay
generic entry was unlawful because it eliminated the generic chal-
lenger's incentive to press for an earlier entry date.
34
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, cash payments from the
brand-name company are presumably exclusionary. The greater the
cash payment in the settlement, the lower the profits from competi-
tion that the generic will insist on. The greater the cash payments, the
later the licensing entry date or the higher the royalty that will be
acceptable to the generic. Hence, significant payments from the pat-
ent holder to the challenger push the settlement in the direction of a
more anticompetitive and more inefficient outcome. This results in
consumers being deprived of the expected gains from patent chal-
lenges that are granted them by the rules and procedures enacted by
Congress that define the patent rights.
B. The Benefits of Generic Patent Challenges Wid Not Be
Reduced by Disallowing Cash Payment Settlements
One court has suggested that a possible benefit of allowing cash
payment settlements is an increased incentive for generics to chal-
lenge patents.35 However, on closer examination, this suggestion has
no merit.
A patent challenge in and of itself is of no benefit. Generic chal-
lenges to patents under Hatch-Waxman are of value only because such
challenges lead to increases in expected competition and, thereby, to
lower consumer prices. Thus, challenges that are successful, either be-
cause of a court finding of invalidity or non-infringement or because
of a licensing settlement agreement, are of value because they are
procompetitive.
If exclusionary cash payment settlements are allowed, those chal-
lenges will result in no increase in competition; moreover, those chal-
lenges that would have settled with competition-enhancing licensing
settlements will also likely conclude with an anticompetitive exclusion-
ary cash payment settlement. This is, of course, contrary to the intent
and purpose of the patent challenge incentives provided under
Hatch-Waxman. 3 6 This inconsistency with the purposes of Hatch-Wax-
man further support the position that the patent rules and procedures
34. Id. at *182-*83.
35. Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
36. See Keith Leffler & Cristofer Leffler, The Probabilistic Nature of Patent Rights: In Re-
sponse to Kevin McDonald, 17 ANTITRUST 77, 80 (2003) [hereinafter Leffler & Leffier, Patent
Rights].
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enacted by Congress do not allow for private agreements to extend
the value of patents via cash payments that result in a sharing of the
monopoly profit between the patent holder and the challenger.
IV. Exclusionary Payment Settlements Likely Have
Insignificant Impacts on Patenting Activity
Absent transaction costs, the optimal set of rights accompanying
any particular innovation would certainly be specific to the innova-
tion. For example, successful innovation that was the result of happen-
stance would receive little or no protection because such protection
would not impact dynamic efficiency. In contrast, innovations with
large social benefits but relatively low private benefits (such as an an-
tibiotic that is resistant to bacteria mutations) would receive very
strong protection. However, given the very high costs of specifying
unique patent rights and procedures for particular innovations, Con-
gress has created a simplified and presumptively efficient set of rights.
Undoubtedly, there may be cases in which a patent holder could
show that extending the patent rights in a particular set of circum-
stances is, on net, efficient because the increase in dynamic efficiency
in that set of circumstances outweighs the static inefficiency. Yet, the
costs of such innovation-specific rule-making presumably outweigh
any efficiency gains. Economically, a cash payment settlement agree-
ment is simply a private agreement that increases the economic value
of a patent beyond the value inherent in the patent rules enacted by
Congress. If situation-specific welfare analysis can justify such private
agreements extending the rights of a patent beyond those granted by
the laws and procedures enacted by Congress, then the same logic
would justify consumer-based challenges to the exercise of the stan-
dard rights granted by Congress when those rights imply net static
inefficiency. If the rules and procedures enacted by Congress can be
challenged by demonstrations balancing static and dynamic efficiency
in a particular case, then the same logic would, for example, permit
consumers to demonstrate that in a particular instance a twenty-year
patent is too long, i.e., not optimal.
However, the balancing of static and dynamic efficiency is diffi-
cult, subject to substantial uncertainty, and expensive. Just as con-
sumer challenges to the length of a patent are not allowed regardless
of whether one can demonstrate the inefficiency of the patent length
in a particular case, private alterations of the other rights granted by
Congress should be presumed inefficient. The patent rights at issue in
the Hatch-Waxman cases concern the inherent uncertainty of the va-
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lidity or substantive scope of a patent that results from the rules and
procedures enacted by Congress. Allowing private agreements that al-
ter the uncertainty by eliminating competitive threats is economically
no different than agreements to extend the temporal terms of the
patent.
Disallowing cash payment settlements will reduce the average ex-
pected profits from a patent. It is reasonable to expect that any policy
change that decreases the average profits from patent activities will
decrease the incentive to engage in such activities. 37 However, noting
the obvious fact that the cash payment settlements may increase ex-
pected innovation provides no more justification for such settlements
than for any other private agreement that results in market exclu-
sion.3 8 The increased innovation is simply not relevant to the welfare
evaluation. The resulting static inefficiency presumably outweighs the
increased dynamic efficiency.
Nonetheless, some courts 9 have expressed concern as to innova-
tion impacts of a per se approach to exclusion payment settlements.40
However, economic principles and the experience of actual cases sug-
gest little impact on innovation from disallowing exclusion payment
settlements. The following propositions identify some economic fac-
37. This is distinct from a presumption that innovation will be reduced. The relation-
ship between patents and innovation is not clear. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this
discussion here, assume that allowing payments settlements that increase the expected re-
turns from a patent would result in an increase in innovation.
38. See, e.g., 12 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw 2043bl, at 237 (1999) ("[An]
agree [ment] not to engage in a certain type of research and development should ordinarily
be regarded as a naked output restriction in the market for new innovations, and thus
should be illegal per se."); 4JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE
REGULATION § 73.02 (2d ed. 2004) ("Per se liability will flow from a horizontal agreement
among competitors to suppress the use of patents for purposes of restraining trade.");
Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd., 605 F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1979) (finding an
agreement not to market product in development was per se unlawful); Discovision v. Disc
Mfg., Inc., No. 95-345-SLR, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7507, at *37-*39 (D. Del. Apr. 3, 1997)
(stating that an agreement that " ' essentially eliminated' the horizontal competitors' 'in-
centive to innovate and design around' [defendant's] patents" is per se unlawful).
39. See In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1349-50
(S.D. Fla. 2000). In Cipro, the court concluded that "when patents are involved .... the
exclusionary effect of the patent must be considered before making any determination as
to whether the alleged restraint is per se illegal." In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride
(Cipro) Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 249 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). The court ruled that the
proper analysis requires balancing "the anticompetitive effects of the Settlement Agree-
ments ... against the benefits of allowing brand-name drug companies to invest in R&D
with some degree of confidence that they will be able to control patent litigation risk." Id.
at 257.
40. A "per se approach" refers to lump sum payment settlements being per se invalid.
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tors that are relevant when evaluating the likely innovative impacts of
disallowing cash payment settlements:
* Settlements that do not reduce litigation costs should be
disallowed.
" The larger the monopoly returns received by the patent holder
prior to a settlement, the smaller the impact from competition
(absent the settlement agreement) on dynamic efficiency. This
follows from the increased likelihood that the patent holder has
collected profit prior to the agreement sufficient to motivate the
innovative effort.
" The greater the number of potential challengers to the patent
holder, the smaller the expected impact on static inefficiency
loss from a settlement. This follows from the expectation that
other challengers will limit any static inefficiency regardless of
the particular settlement.
* The smaller the R&D investment necessary to obtain the patent,
the smaller any impact on dynamic efficiency from competition
absent the settlement.
" The smaller the consumer benefits from the patent innovation,
the smaller any impact on dynamic efficiency from allowing com-
petition. Dynamic efficiency results from the expected consumer
surplus from a new product that would not have been produced
absent the patent. Innovations that yield little or no additional
consumer surplus do not increase dynamic efficiency.
" The greater the likelihood that the patent holder could collect
the damages from infringement, the smaller any impact on dy-
namic efficiency from allowing competition. Dynamic efficiency
losses occur only because of profit reductions resulting from
competition. If infringement damages are collectible, there can
be no adverse impact on dynamic efficiency.
To understand the application of these propositions, presume
that the rules judging the legality of a firm's exclusionary cash pay-
ment settlement take into account the likely impact on the firm's in-
centive to engage in the R&D efforts that lead to new pharmaceuticals
if the firm had known that the cash payment settlement would not be
allowed in certain circumstances. The propositions imply, for exam-
ple, that agreements that occur only after significant monopoly profits
have been earned will be disfavored. Similarly, agreements that ad-
versely impact the cost of entry of others outside the agreement will be
disfavored, as will agreements that involve the only likely patent chal-
lenger. In contrast, if the agreement occurs with a payment less than
the expected litigation costs, or if the agreement concerns a challeng-
ing firm with little or no resources to enter, the agreement will more
likely be found legal.
The propositions outlined above are intended to impact firms, ex
ante R&D decisions. Thus, for example, if a company engaged in R&D
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knows that payment settlement agreements will be disallowed when
those agreements are made after significant monopoly profits have
been earned, the impact on R&D investment decisions and on dy-
namic efficiency will be minimal. If, however, such agreements are
disallowed prior to the earning of significant profits from the R&D
investments, more significant impacts will result. The other proposi-
tions should be interpreted similarly.41
Application of these principles can be illustrated from the facts of
In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation,42 a case dealing with
Abbott's patents of terazosin hydrochloride, which Abbott marketed
under the brand name Hytrin. 43 In 1977 and 1978, Abbott was
granted the '894 and '097 patents on Hytrin, respectively. 44 These pat-
ents gave Abbott a monopoly on the sale of the terazosin hydrochlo-
ride molecule until the patents expired in 1994 and 1995. 4 5 Thus,
Abbott fully exploited its patent rights under these patents in its mar-
keting of Hytrin. Abbott received its '207 patent in 1996.46 This patent
covered a Form IV anhydrous version of Hytrin.47 Abbott sued the
generic ANDA filers48 of capsule forms of terazosin hydrochloride for
infringement of this patent.49 However, Abbott never marketed a
pharmaceutical using the '207 patent. Hence, no therapeutic advan-
tages or innovation important to consumers resulted from this patent,
and therefore, no apparent increase in dynamic efficiency resulted
from the '207 patent.50 The '207 patent did have value because it ef-
fectively extended Abbott's Hytrin monopoly. Because of the '207 pat-
ent, under FDA rules, generic manufacturers making an anhydrous
41. As another example, consider the proposition that the smaller the consumer ben-
efits from the patent innovation, the smaller any impact on dynamic efficiency from al-
lowing competition. This proposition should be interpreted as implying that disallowing
payment agreements for patents that provide small consumer benefits will have less impact
on dynamic efficiency than disallowing such agreements for patents related to socially im-
portant innovation.
42. 164 F. Supp. 2d 1340 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
43. Id. at 1340.
44. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., No. 99-MDL-1317, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17518, at *14-*16 (S.D. Fla. June 23, 2004).
45. Id. at *15-*16. Abbott also received a patent on a dihydrate form of terazosin in
1981. Id. at *17.
46. Id. at *18.
47. Id.
48. An "ANDA filer" is a party who has filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application. In
re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, 2003 F.T.C. LEXIS 187, at *2 (Dec. 8, 2003).
49. In re Terazosin, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17518, at *22-*32.
50. Innovation refers to some valuable new product (or process or method of produc-
tion). The '207 patent was found to be invalid because the Form IV anhydrous version
claimed was not new. Id. at *35. Therefore, the "patent" did not represent innovation.
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form of Hytrin were required to file a Paragraph IV Certification,
which led to an automatic thirty month delay in FDA approval. These
facts imply that Abbott received substantial monopoly profits from Hy-
trin prior to its exclusionary settlements with the generic challengers,
Geneva and Zenith. 51 Therefore, we suggest that there would have
been little impact on Abbott's terazosin R&D had it known at the time
of its investments that a cash payment settlement in the late 90s would
not be legal. In addition, the disputed patent did not generate signifi-
cant consumer benefit. Hence, according to the principles outlined
above, the agreement should be disfavored on a dynamic efficiency
basis.
On August 28, 1998, the district court ruled the '207 patent inva-
lid,52 and the appellate court upheld this ruling in July 1999.5 3 There
is a strong likelihood that, at the time of the decision, the district
court ruling of invalidity was correct, 54 as district court decisions as to
invalidity are usually upheld on appeal. 55 Thus, after the district court
ruling of invalidity, there is little concern with any impacts on dynamic
efficiency and innovation activity from any expected generic competi-
tion related to the '207 patent. Therefore, continued adherence to
the settlement agreements after the patent had been held invalid
should be disfavored.
51. In addition, a number of generic producers had filed ANDAs for a tablet form of
Hytrin in the early 1990s in anticipation of the expiration of the '894 and '097 patents. In
1995, Abbott began marketing a capsule form of Hytrin, and Abbott converted nearly all
Hytrin sales to the capsule form. The generics' tablet forms submitted for ANDAs would
not have A-B rated FDA equivalence to Hytrin in its capsule form. This meant that pharma-
cists could not substitute the generic tablet for the Hytrin capsule without the prescribing
physician's approval. As a result, the change to the capsule form effectively increased Ab-
bott's monopoly profits from Hytrin beyond those of its initial patents without Abbott in-
curring significant additional R&D expenses.
52. Abbott Labs. v. Geneva Pharms. Inc., No. 96 C 3331, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13864,
at *24 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 1998).
53. Abbott Labs. v. Geneva Pharms. Inc., 182 F.3d 1315, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
54. The number of generics challenging the '207 patent also provides evidence that
the patent was likely invalid. See In re Terazosin, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17518, at *32-*36.
55. See, e.g., Allison & Lemley, supra note 12, at 241 tbl.15 (illustrating that of seventy-
eight cases appealed from 1989 through 1996, 83.3% decisions of invalidity were affirmed);
Moore, supra note 12, at 397 tbl.6 (stating that of 620 cases appealed from 1993 through
1998, 78% of district court decisions concerning validity were affirmed); FED. TRADE
COMM'N, supra note 10, at 21 (explaining a study which found the rate at which the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit overturned district court decisions of patent inva-
lidity for drug products to be 8%). The presumption that district court findings of invalid-
ity are "accurate" is implicit in the use of the district court invalidity decision date for
purposes of the 180-day exclusivity for the first ANDA filer. See Abbott Labs. v. Mylan
Pharms., 37 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1078 (N.D. Ill. 1999); TorPharm Inc., v. Shalala, No. 97-
1925, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21983, at *9-*12 (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 1997).
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Under Hatch-Waxman, Geneva, the first ANDA filer, had a 180-
day exclusive over the capsule version of a generic Hytrin. The period
of exclusivity began only from the date of Geneva's marketing of the
generic or from the time of a decision of invalidity. The Abbott-Ge-
neva settlement agreement that delayed Geneva's marketing therefore
not only delayed Geneva's entry decision, but it also impacted the in-
centive for other generics to aggressively challenge the Hytrin patent.
Hence, in this case, Geneva was effectively the only challenger of the
'207 patent. This factor would also support disfavoring this settlement
agreement under the analysis of possible dynamic efficiency effects
outlined above.5 6
V. A Probabilistic Analysis of Patents Is Consistent with
Traditional Civil Burdens of Proof
The approach presented here is based on the fact that patent
rights are probabilistic in nature.5 7 The probability that a patent will
be found to be invalid is what gives rise to the expected consumer
benefits from a patent challenge. However, in a recent article, Marc
Schildkraut argued that cash payment settlements should be allowed
because any anticompetitive impact from the settlement is speculative
due to its probabilistic nature. Schildkraut claims that "[u]ncertain
competition analysis is a substantial departure from the traditional
civil burdens of proof."58 We believe Schildkraut's claim is incorrect.
The harmful effects of rejecting "probabilistic anticompetitive ef-
fects" under the Sherman Antitrust Act ("Sherman Act") are clear.5 9
To illustrate, consider a hypothetical in which a firm has a monopoly
over a product that is distributed throughout the United States. As-
sume another firm manages to make a perfect substitute for the prod-
uct, but that this potential entrant has limited capacity and will be able
to supply only 10% of the country. Prior to the entrant deciding
where it would market the competing product, the incumbent and
the potential entrant enter into an agreement in which the incumbent
pays the potential entrant not to enter. In this situation, no consumer
56. Note also that the settlements in Hytrin did not resolve the patent litigation but
rather only prevented generic entry prior to the conclusion of the litigation. Hence, in this
case, the agreements resulted in little savings in litigation costs and therefore resulted in
little or no gains in static efficiency. The settlement agreements were therefore clearly
anticompetitive.
57. The probabilistic nature of all property rights is discussed at length in Leffler &
Leffler, Patent Rights, supra note 36, at 77.
58. Schildkraut, supra note 23, at 1049.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
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could establish that it was harmed with certainty since there is only a
10% probability that the entry would have occurred in any particular
place. However, following the Schildkraut approach, which requires
certainty rather than probability, no plaintiff could bring an action
against such a clearly anticompetitive agreement.
Fortunately, a recent case, United States v. Microsoft Corp.,60 demon-
strates that the elimination of uncertain competitive benefits is unlaw-
ful under the Sherman Act.61 In Microsoft, the Department of Justice
alleged that Microsoft unlawfully maintained its operating system mo-
nopoly by foreclosing Netscape's and Java's distribution channels.
Microsoft countered that there could be no finding that it had vio-
lated the Sherman Act absent proof that the Netscape or Java prod-
ucts, which were only in developmental stages, would in fact have
developed into commercially viable products.62 The court of appeals
rejected that contention because "It] o require that [Sherman Act] lia-
bility turn on a plaintiff's ability or inability to reconstruct the hypo-
thetical marketplace absent a defendant's anticompetitive conduct
would only encourage monopolists to take more and earlier anticom-
petitive action."63 The court held that exclusionary conduct is unlaw-
ful when it
is aimed at producers of nascent competitive technologies as well
as when it is aimed at producers of established substitutes. Admit-
tedly, in the former case there is added uncertainty, in-as-much as
nascent threats are merely potential substitutes. But the underlying
proof problem is the same-neither plaintiffs nor the court can
confidently reconstruct a product's hypothetical technological de-
velopment in a world absent the defendant's exclusionary
conduct. 64
Thus, under the Sherman Act, a plaintiff could show an anticom-
petitive impact without showing that the Netscape and Java products
"would actually have developed into viable platform substitutes. '65
Rather, the plaintiff need only show that "as a general matter the ex-
clusion of nascent threats is the type of conduct that is reasonably
capable of contributing significantly to a defendant's continued mo-
nopoly power."66 "[R]easonably capable of contributing to a defen-
dant's continued monopoly power" may be interpreted to mean a
60. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
61. Id. at 78.
62. Id. at 78-79.
63. Id. at 79.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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reasonable probability that the alleged illegal behavior reduces con-
sumer welfare.
Similarly, in Microbix Biosystems, Inc. v. Biowhittaker, Inc.,67 the
court held that a plaintiff could establish a violation of the rule of
reason even though subsequent conduct implied that no one was in
fact harmed by the defendant's conduct. 68 In Microbix, a brand-name
pharmaceutical manufacturer entered into an exclusive supply agree-
ment with a firm that was the only source of a key input, thus denying
the input to generic manufacturers. 69 The court held that if the plain-
tiff could establish the facts alleged, "the anti-competitive effects of
the exclusive agreement would be obvious. '70 The court reached that
conclusion even though the plaintiffs theory of causation required it
to show "that Plaintiff would have successfully secured a manufactur-
ing facility, obtained FDA approval, developed the [product] in com-
mercial quantities, and marketed the product during the relevant
time frame."71 Indeed, although the court entered summary judg-
ment against the plaintiff on the causation question,7 2 the court nev-
ertheless held that the facts alleged as to liability stated a cause of
action. 73
These cases firmly establish that it is anticompetitive for an in-
cumbent manufacturer to enter into an agreement to eliminate po-
tential competition, based on the probability that the competition
would in fact have occurred. 74 Indeed, a leading antitrust treatise ad-
dressing this issue notes that "the law does not condone the purchaser
of protection from uncertain competition any more than it condones
the elimination of actual competition." 75
67. 172 F. Supp. 2d 680 (D. Md. 2000).
68. Id. at 692-94.
69. Id. at 692.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 698.
72. This was because the evidence showed that these tasks would not in fact have been
completed before other intervening events-including an FDA ban on the importation of
the product-severed the chain of causation. Id.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int'l, 256 F.3d 799, 806-07 (D.C. Cir.
2001); Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd., 605 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1979) (holding
that it is unlawful to agree to suppress a product of which only a prototype had been
made); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1075 (S.D.
Ind. 2001) ("Potential competitors cannot stifle nascent competition by entering into an
agreement restraining trade.").
75. 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 38, 2030b, at 175.
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VI. Concluding Remarks-Judging Patent Settlements Based
on the Patent's Validity Makes No Economic Sense
We have argued that basic economic and logic principles imply
that patent settlements between competitors should be judged on a
static basis and that static benefits from such settlements are limited to
the cost of litigation.76 Our argument implies that cash payment settle-
ments should be judged illegal under a per se rule. While it is theoret-
ically possible that settlement requires cash payments, such cases are
of no practical relevance. We have also argued that when settlement is
possible, consumers should be included in the benefits from settle-
ment. Hence, this implies that settlements should be disfavored unless
consumers receive benefits such as those expected if the litigation was
pursued. 77 However, the expected static consumer benefit from litiga-
tion depends on the probability that the patent will be found to be
valid. This has led some courts and commentators to suggest that the
proper policy approach in judging these settlements should take into
account the "actual" validity of the patent.78
Recently, Kevin McDonald has taken this approach a step further,
arguing that the risk that a federal court adjudicating a patent dispute
might erroneously conclude that a patent is invalid can cause sub-opti-
mal investments in R&D, and accordingly, a patent holder should be
permitted to pay a challenger to recognize the validity of the patent.79
McDonald suggests that a proper resolution of the possibility of false
positives is to require an antitrust plaintiff challenging the lawfulness
of a lump sum settlement to establish in the antitrust litigation that
the patent, in fact, is invalid.80
However, rather than promoting efficient settlements that reduce
litigation costs, evaluating settlements based on the "validity" of the
patents will increase the expected cost of litigation. Settling parties
have no incentive to challenge their own settlement agreement;
rather, any challenge to a patent settlement will likely be in an anti-
trust case brought by the purchasers of the patented product or by the
government. Yet, these antitrust plaintiffs taking on the burden of
demonstrating invalidity have to start from scratch and re-learn much
76. See Leffler & Leffler, Settling the Controversy, supra note 28, at 477-85.
77. This is also the view taken by Shapiro. See Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent
Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391, 396 (2003).
78. See, e.g., Kevin McDonald, Hatch-Waxman Patent Settlements and Antitrust: On Proba-
bilistic Patent Rights and False Positives, ANTITRUST, Spring 2003, at 68.
79. Id. at 74-75.
80. Id.
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of what the generic challenger likely knew before accepting the settle-
ment. In addition, as antitrust plaintiffs, purchasers are likely to be at
an information disadvantage compared to the generic challenger be-
cause the generic challenger is in the business of researching
pharmaceuticals, understanding pharmaceutical patents, and assess-
ing patent validity.
If patent settlements are judged on the basis of the patent valid-
ity, in addition to having the "wrong plaintiff' challenger, substantial
time is likely to be lost between the resolution of the original patent
dispute via settlement and resolution of the settlement challenge. 81
This substantial delay is problematic because, even if the antitrust
plaintiffs ultimately prevail, damages do not rectify the harm to con-
sumers done by the substantial delay in resolution. For example, in
response to the high cost of pharmaceuticals, many consumers forego
taking medicine or cut the prescribed doses.82 This harm to consum-
ers is not corrected in any form in an antitrust action.
Distilled to its essence, the view that the validity of cash payment
settlements should rest upon the validity or invalidity of the patent
implies that such settlements should generally be prohibited because
they do not settle anything. The patent litigation is simply delayed, a
disadvantaged plaintiff is substituted for the best plaintiff, and the cost
of the litigation is increased.
81. The time problem is well exemplified by ongoing litigation: in 1992, the Zeneca-
ICI patent on tamoxifen was found to be invalid. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust
Litig., 277 F. Supp. 2d 121, 125 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). In 1993, Zeneca and Barr entered into a
lump sum settlement agreement whereby Barr abandoned its patent challenge. Id. at 125.
Seven years later, in 2000, private plaintiffs filed suit. Id. Eleven years after the agreement
was entered, the case remains under appeal.
In August 1995, Upsher filed an ANDA for a generic version of Schering-Plough's K-
Dur. In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, 2003 F.T.C. LEXIS 187 (Dec. 8, 2003). On
June 17, 1997, the eve of litigation concerning the validity of Schering-Plough's patent,
Upsher and Schering-Plough entered a settlement agreement with lump sum payments
from Schering-Plough to Upsher. The settlement delayed generic entry until September
2001. The FTC and private litigants challenged the settlement. The FTC subsequently
ruled on December 18, 2003 that the settlement agreement was illegal and anticompeti-
tive. However, that decision has been appealed and neither the FTC's case nor the private
cases are resolved more than seven years after the settlement agreement.
In 1991, Barr challenged Bayer's patent on Cipro. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride
(Cipro) Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). The trial on the validity of
the patent was scheduled to begin in January of 1997. At that time, Bayer and Barr entered
into settlement agreements in which Barr withdrew its challenge. As part of the agree-
ments, Bayer made substantial payments to Barr. Id. at 195-96. Private cases alleging the
agreements to be illegal were filed and have yet to be tried.
82. See CLAUDIA L. SCHUR ET AL,, LACK OF PRESCRIPTION COVERAGE AMONG THE UNDER
65: A SYMPTOM OF UNDERINSURANCE 2 (2004); CTR. ON AN AGING Soc'Y, GEORGETOWN UNIV.,
DATA PROFILE No. 5, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: A VITAL COMPONENT OF HEALTHCARE 4 (2002).
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Appendix
TABLE 1
Assumptions for Analysis of Need for Cash Payments to
Achieve an Efficient Settlement
Annual Market Size (at Brand Price ("BP")) $500 million
Expected Monopoly Period with Settlement 3 years
Generic Price with Exclusivity (%BP) 70%
Generic Price with Generic Competition (%BP) 20%
Brand Market Share with Generic Exclusivity 40%
Brand Market Share with Generic Competition 20%
Entrant Generic Market Share with Generic Competition 33%
Brand Variable Costs with Marketing (%BP) 40%
Brand Variable Costs with Reduced Marketing (%BP) 10%
Generic Variable Costs (%BP) 10%
Discount Rate 10%
Litigation Cost (each) $20 million
TABLE 2
Expectations of Winning Patent Litigation for Which
Settlement is Possible
Assumed Expectation of Maximum Expectation for Generic Firm for Which
Brand Firm Settlement Is Possible
With Cash Payment With Early Entry License
100% 56% 41%
94% 100% 80%
<91.6% 100% 100%
Assumed Expectation of Maximum Expectation for Brand Firm for Which
Generic Firm Settlement Is Possible
With Cash Payment With Early Entry License
100% 94% 91%
56% 100% 97%
<41.1% 100% 100%
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